This paper examines how pharmaceutical firms have responded to changes in intellectual property rights and trade barriers that legalized "parallel imports" within the European Union. The threat of arbitrage by parallel traders reduces the ability of firms to price discriminate across countries. I analyze the extent of parallel trade in a dataset of drug prices and sales from 1993-2004 covering 30 countries. Due to regulations on price and antitrust law on rationing supply, pharmaceutical firms may rely on non-price responses. Such responses include differentiation of products across countries and selective "culling" of product lines to reduce arbitrage opportunities, as well as raising rivals' (arbitrageurs') costs through choice of packaging. I find evidence that the behavior of pharmaceutical firms in the EU with respect to their product portfolios is consistent with attempts to reduce parallel trade. This may at least partially explain why parallel trade has not yet resulted in significant price convergence across EU countries. Accounting for
I. Introduction
How do firms respond to a decrease in their ability to price discriminate?
Multinational firms, in particular, often rely on trade barriers or intellectual property rights to charge different prices in different countries in response to local market conditions. Changes in trade or intellectual property law can therefore have important effects on market segmentation. This paper examines how European integration has affected the product market strategies of pharmaceutical firms. In particular, it illustrates the importance of non-price responses by multinational firms, such as adjustments in product offerings or characteristics, to maintain price differences across borders.
Cross-national differences in pharmaceutical prices are the topic of much discussion in the press and in policy circles. Representative Henry Waxman (D-CA), a vocal critic of the pharmaceutical industry, maintains that: "A grandmother on the Westside has to pay more than twice as much for her drugs as a grandmother in France, in Canada, in Germany, in Italy, and in the United Kingdom. And for some drugs, seniors in Los Angeles are paying over three times more than seniors in other countries. This unconscionable gouging is unacceptable and has to end."
1 Quite a few studies have documented these differences (Stuart et al. (2000) , Danzon and Chao (2002) , Danzon and Furukawa (2005) ) and provided some explanations for their underlying causes, such as differences in patient demand, national income, and the use of price controls by governments. Historically, these price differences have persisted because of laws preventing arbitrage of drugs across borders. These laws include regulations on the right to sell a drug in a country as well as rights granted to patent-holders to prevent the sale of a product by other firms without authorization.
While arbitrage of drugs, or "parallel trade," remains illegal in most countries, it is now permitted within the European Union. This is part of the move to a single market for pharmaceuticals in the EU; other changes include harmonization of regulations for the approval of new drugs, the adoption of the Euro, and the application of Articles 28-30 1 http://www.democrats.reform.house.gov/investigations.asp?Issue=Price+Discrimination governing the free movement of goods within the EU. The EU has established a policy of "community exhaustion" of most forms of intellectual property 2 , which means that once a firm has put the drug on the market in any EU country, it may not prevent the sale of that drug within the EU by any other firm by claiming a violation of patent rights or trademarks, under most circumstances. The combination of these changes has reduced the ability of firms in all industries to price discriminate across EU countries, but has been of particular concern to pharmaceutical firms, which face price controls in many EU countries.
The issue of parallel imports is at the intersection of competition law, intellectual property (IP) law, and trade law, and therefore is an important policy issue for governments and international organizations. There have been proposals in the United
States to permit parallel imports from Canada (and other countries) in the last several years; re-importation of drugs was an important campaign issue in 2004 for Senator John
Kerry and the subject of a Congressional Budget Office study.
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In addition, nongovernmental organizations such as Doctors Without Borders/Medicins Sans Frontieres have lobbied extensively for a policy of "international exhaustion" of patent rights, which would remove the current barrier of IP rights to parallel trade in most countries. 4 Both the law and the strategies firms use in response to parallel imports are relevant not only to the pharmaceutical industry, but to all IP-intensive firms that are active in multiple countries, some of which contend with illegal pirating that is not well-policed in addition to legal parallel trade.
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This paper examines the extent of parallel imports of pharmaceuticals within the EU, and describes the strategic responses by firms to dampen the resulting profit losses. I find that parallel imports have not yet led to a large reduction in aggregate price dispersion across EU countries, consistent with other recent empirical studies of drug prices (Kanavos et al. (2004) , Danzon and Chao (2002) ). While the number of products experiencing parallel imports has been increasing, it is still a small fraction of the total number of pharmaceutical products. I find evidence that efforts by pharmaceutical firms to adjust to the threat of parallel imports may have moderated the impact. The setting examined in this paper is useful for understanding how firms adapt to a change in the legal environment that affects the ability to price discriminate. This research highlights the importance of considering all strategic options available to firms and the interaction of multiple policies when assessing the impact of parallel trade, or a change in trade and intellectual property laws more generally.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II reviews the literature on parallel trade and describes the pharmaceutical market in the European Union. Section III presents a simple model of entry by parallel traders and describes what strategic options might be expected from pharmaceutical firms. Section IV describes the data, and Section V estimates the entry model and presents evidence of strategic responses. Section VI discusses and concludes.
Section II. Overview of the pharmaceutical industry in the EU and relevant literature
The move to a European Common Market has directly affected the pharmaceutical industry in several ways. One major change is the process of obtaining approval to market a drug in the EU. Historically, a firm wishing to sell a new drug had to submit a separate application for marketing approval in each European country, and was to different regulatory standards in each. In an effort to form a single market for pharmaceuticals, the EU established two procedures for drug approval in 1995. The first of these, the Mutual Recognition Procedure, allows a firm to apply for marketing approval in one "reference member state" (RMS). Following approval in the RMS, the firm may launch the drug in other EU countries without additional applications unless another country raises a formal objection over concerns about safety and efficacy. The other procedure, which is required for biological products but optional for most others, involves an application to the newly created European Medicines Evaluation Agency (EMEA) for an EU-wide marketing approval. These processes have reduced the fixed cost of obtaining regulatory approval in multiple EU countries.
However, selling a drug in most EU countries involves more than approval through either procedure. Prices are not determined by market conditions in general. All but a few countries use explicit price controls on pharmaceuticals, necessitating a sometimes lengthy negotiation with health agencies responsible for providing health coverage to the local population. Many countries also use international reference pricing, and specify that the launch price is set at the minimum or average of the price in a basket of other countries. Once a drug is marketed in several countries at different prices, therefore, any convergence towards a uniform price tends toward the minimum. For this reason, many firms attempt to launch at a uniform price, but this can lead to lengthy launch delays in countries where governments prefer to set a lower price (Danzon and Epstein (2005) ). Despite the reduction in the fixed cost of additional entry conditional on launch in one EU country, there are large differences in the set of drugs available across these countries, which are at least partly attributable to price regulation , Kyle (2005) ).
Besides changes in the approval process, pharmaceutical firms have experienced an important change in the protection afforded by patents they hold in the EU. Court decisions by the European Court of Justice during the last 25-30 years have established a policy of "community exhaustion" of patent rights and other forms of intellectual property, such as trademarks and copyrights. Once a patent holder has sold a product within the EU, subsequent buyers may trade it freely within the EU and without interference by the patent holder. A "derogation" period was imposed for countries with relatively weak patent rights prior to joining the EU. These include Spain and Portugal before 1995, and the eight EU ascension members of 2004 (the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Slovak Republic, and Slovenia). During the derogation period, these countries could not serve as sources of parallel imports. Note the patent holder may still prevent the sale of products first marketed outside the EU; it remains illegal to import drugs from Africa, for example, without the permission of the patent holder. But the combination of large price differences within the EU, some of which exist because of price controls, and the inability of pharmaceutical firms to use intellectual property rights to prevent resale of their products has given rise to parallel imports.
There are some restrictions on parallel imports. A parallel importer must obtain a license to import a product of identical chemical composition, dosage form, and strength from a country with a lower price. If the product has packaging in a different language, has a different brand name, or has a different pack size, the parallel trader may incur repackaging costs. The cost of a license is approximately €1500 in most countries or €3480
for products approved through the EMEA. For additional detail, please see the EMEA's "Post-Authorisation Guidance on Parallel Distribution" and Arfwedson (2004) .
In addition to securing a license and finding adequate supply, a parallel importer must find pharmacists willing to purchase their imports. This may seem simple enough; the parallel importer can offer the product at a lower price than that of the original product in the destination country. However, there are a host of country-specific regulations on pharmacists, in addition to pharmaceuticals. For example, a number of countries, including Denmark, Sweden, and Germany, fix the profit margins of pharmacists. This reduces the incentive of pharmacists to seek out the lowest cost supply, and hence their demand for parallel imports. Germany has imposed a quota on the volume of parallel imports a pharmacist must dispense (now 7%), but since his margins are fixed, the pharmacist has no strong motivation to find parallel imports that are any cheaper than the original product. The Netherlands and the United Kingdom use "clawback" mechanisms: any savings from the use of parallel imports are shared between the pharmacist and the government health authority, so pharmacists do have some incentive to find a low-cost supply. Patients in all EU countries have government insurance coverage for most prescriptions, and are rather insensitive to price as a result.
In principle, the legalization of parallel imports, as well as the elimination of exchange rate fluctuations resulting from the Euro's adoption, should reduce price dispersion across EU countries. However, empirical evidence of the effect of EU integration on price dispersion is mixed. Goldberg and Verboven (2005) find that prices for automobiles have become more uniform within the EU following the adoption of the Euro and other attempts to integrate the European markets, although there remain persistent differences. Ganslandt and Maskus (2004) show that parallel imports have resulted in a reduction of the prices of original products for the top 50 drugs in Sweden.
However, another study (Kanavos et al. (2004) ) finds parallel imports have had little effect on prices in the EU for the 20 top-selling drugs. By and large, parallel imports of these drugs were not sold at much of a discount to original products. The authors point out that parallel imports do not generate significant savings either to patients or to national health systems in most cases.
Most papers on parallel trade assume that the only strategic instruments firms have at their disposal are price, rationing of supply, and exit from a market. The focus of these papers is the welfare impact of a move from international price discrimination to a uniform world (or regional) price, following Varian (1985) . Malueg and Schwartz (1994) show that parallel trade reduces global welfare if there are large differences in demand across countries, because firms will choose not to serve low-price countries. A limitation of applying the Malueg and Schwartz model to the pharmaceutical industry is that it does not explicitly consider how an inability to price discriminate affects incentives to invest in research and development (R&D). More recent research analyzes the additional welfare consequences for R&D, including Danzon (1998) , Rey (2003) , and Valletti (2005a, 2005b) . These papers point out that parallel trade can reduce investment in quality or R&D as a result of reducing profits to patent-holders, so that even in cases where parallel trade benefits many consumers in the short run, welfare tends to be lower in the long run. The possibility that firms employ second degree price discrimination is not explored in most theoretical work on parallel trade. Anderson and Ginsburgh (1999) consider the possibility that firms introduce versions of their products in a foreign country in order to price discriminate across consumers with different arbitrage costs, and find that under some circumstances, world welfare is increasing in the cost of arbitrage.
Price controls significantly constrain the ability of firms to increase prices, so it is not usually possible to set a uniform price at the average between the high and low price markets. 6 Another important factor limiting the application of standard economic models of price discrimination is EU competition law. Practices that interfere with parallel trade or that can be shown to be an abuse of dominant position, such as rationing supply to a low price market, are legally problematic. Several drug firms have made attempts to control supply; these were evaluated in Bundesverband der Arzneimittel-Importeure and
Commission of the European Communities v. Bayer AG (C-2/01 P and C-3/01 P). In
October of 2005, the European Association of Euro-Pharmaceutical Companies asked the European Union antitrust authorities to investigate Pfizer for using contracts in Spain that reward wholesalers for keeping products within the Spanish market.
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Pharmaceutical firms are therefore limited in their ability to use price and rationing as strategic variables in response to parallel trade: in general, they cannot raise prices in the lower-price markets (though they should encounter little resistance to lowering prices in higher-price markets), and they may not explicitly ration supply.
Withdrawing all versions of a drug from a low price market may be politically costly, and more importantly, could be interpreted by a government as a failure to "work" a patent and result in compulsory licensing -which may then also serve as parallel imports into other countries. Due to community exhaustion of intellectual property rights, firms may not rely on intellectual property claims to prevent arbitrage across borders. Decisions made about the timing of entry and initial price are crucial, given the constraints on ex 6 These constraints include laws restricting the rate of price increases or requiring government approval to increase price. While pharmaceutical firms could seek a price increase in countries with price controls, they find it difficult to persuade governments facing their own EU-imposed limits on budget deficits to increase expenditures. This research focuses on the threat of parallel trade in particular (separate from price controls), and considers additional strategic choices firms make: that of product characteristics. It follows a number of recent empirical papers exploring non-price strategic responses to competition. Mazzeo (2002) demonstrates that motels choose quality to soften competition. Dafny (2005a Dafny ( , 2005b shows that hospitals, which also face constraints on price responses, find other means to respond to regulatory or competitive changes. This can be in their choice of how to classify a procedure (Dafny (2005a) ), or in their investment in quality as a product characteristic (Dafny (2005b) ). In industries like consumer electronics or DVD distribution, firms exploit differences in product characteristics such as standards across countries for geographic market segmentation. Software firms change the characteristics of their products sold in lowprice countries to make them less attractive to buyers in high-price countries, by removing certain features, for example. In the case of pharmaceuticals, product characteristics such as brand name, dosage form, and strength for a particular molecule may serve a similar purpose. In general, these decisions are of second-order concern relative to the decision to launch a drug. However, they can be quite important in the context of parallel trade, and, in particular, for understanding why parallel trade has had relatively little impact on price convergence so far.
This research uses data on a wider variety of products than the Ganslandt and Maskus (2004) and Kanavos (2004) papers, so it is possible to study additional factors that might affect arbitrage. The detailed information on product characteristics -in particular, those characteristics chosen by drug firms after development costs are largely sunk -allows me to look for non-price responses to parallel trade. The data also covers 15 non-EU countries, enabling me to isolate strategic changes specific to parallel trade in the EU separately from general changes in product portfolios.
III. Conditions for parallel trade and strategic responses
I begin by considering the decision by a potential arbitrageur to begin parallel importing a particular product, conditional on having entered the business of parallel importing in general. A first requirement is that a match in chemical composition, dosage form, and strength exist between a lower price country and a high price country. Assuming a product match exists, the entry condition for a parallel importer is:
where p H is the price of the product in the higher-price country, p L is the price of the matching product in the lower-price country, c T is the cost of transporting a product between the countries, q is the number of units the parallel importer supplies in the 8 The stringency of this requirement is unclear. The European Court of Justice ruled in Kohlpharma GmBH vs. Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Case C-112/02) that the products must be "substantially identical," and that there be no safety concerns related to the differences. Future litigation on this point is likely. However, differences in appearance might affect the willingness of buyers to substitute towards the parallel import.
higher-price market, and L is the license fee. That is, a parallel importer will enter a product market if it expects to cover its fixed costs (L) with a high enough margin (p Hp L -c T ) on sufficient quantity (q).
The originator can influence the entry decision of a parallel importer through changes in some of these variables. As discussed above, originators are prevented from raising p L due to price controls, but they do have the option of lowering p H to narrow the price difference, and therefore the attractiveness of entry to a parallel trader. They can increase the transportation costs for a parallel importer by using different brand names in different countries and a variety of different package sizes; this requires the parallel trader to repackage the product for import. Finally, they may reduce the per-package volume of sales for a drug by splitting the total volume over many different versions.
Since the parallel importer must obtain a license for each of these versions in the high price country, this has the effect of increasing its relative fixed costs. Rationing -or restricting supply to low price countries -is another strategic response that limits q. It is probably the easiest strategy for originators to implement, at least in the short run, but it is also of questionable legality.
9 Due to the limitations of my dataset, it is difficult for me to identify when rationing occurs with much certainty.
Since at least the 1970s, pharmaceutical firms and others have challenged parallel imports under trademark law. While trademarks are usually internationally exhausted, trademark owners object to any changes made to packaging that might interfere with the trademark, usually arguing that such changes interfere with a buyer's ability to identify the manufacturer. The European Court of Justice has established the circumstances under which repackaging is permissible in a series of decisions; 10 most of these decisions did not result in as many restrictions on parallel trade as trademark owners would have liked.
While I do not consider non-market strategies such as litigation in response to parallel trade, the uncertainty surrounding the legality of parallel imports has limited their prevalence through at least the mid-1990s.
To illustrate how these various strategies work in practice, Table 1 have run all the following analyses on the subset of chemicals that have been marketed in the US, and therefore meet FDA standards for safety and efficacy.
IMS identifies some products in the Midas data as parallel imports, though the source country is unknown. In the dataset provided to me, the only countries with a 12 I am forced to assume, for lack of a better data source, that IMS mislabels whether products are parallel imports but does include all product sales. 13 For example, a firm called Delta Pharmaceuticals is a parallel importer of some products into the UK. A firm by the same name markets 2 drugs in Portugal, which are flagged as parallel imports using my rule. Delta does not market the same drugs in the UK, so these are probably two different firms.
Parallel trade takes place only if price differences exist across markets, so I now describe the general patterns of price dispersion of drugs in my data. I aggregate over all packages (and both original and parallel imported products) within a market so that the unit of analysis is a drug-period observation. There are often large price differences across different packages produced by the same firm, and averaging over them in this way obscures some important variation in price. However, it is difficult to do a meaningful comparison of prices at the package level across countries, because there is strikingly little overlap in the set of packages available in one country and in another. In dispersion is also greater within the subset of drugs for which some parallel trade took place, indicating that parallel importers enter markets with the larger price differentials, on average, but do not result in price convergence; this can also be seen graphically in Figure 11 . At the aggregate level, therefore, parallel imports have had only a small effect, if any, on price dispersion. In contrast, Goldberg and Verboven (2005) find that EU integration has reduced price dispersion in automobiles, an industry which, like pharmaceuticals, historically had large price differences across countries. The focus of the rest of the analysis is at a micro level.
V. Results
To start, I estimate the simple model of parallel trade entry presented in Section IV. Ideally, I would estimate entry into each source-destination product pair, since a parallel importer must specify the country from which it will obtain supply. However, I
am unable to identify the source country of parallel imports in my data; I observe only the destination market. I therefore estimate entry by parallel importers into product j in country i using a logit, and use proxies for the terms in the profit function related to price differences, availability of supply for parallel imports, demand for parallel imports, and transportation costs. Table 5 provides these variable definitions and parameter estimates.
I include country, time period, and therapeutic class fixed effects to control for differences in the costs or benefits to entry related to regulation of pharmacists, storage requirements, and other factors.
Results are consistent with expectations. The probability of entry by parallel importers is increasing in the average price difference between country i and other EU member states, the volume of sales in country i, and the availability of lower cost supplies elsewhere. Parallel imports are less likely when the product has many different brand names in the EU, since a parallel trader would have to incur additional repackaging costs to sell them in country i. The parameter estimates are largely robust to changes in the sample of drugs (results not shown here). These results indicate that parallel traders react to factors at least partially under the control of originators. I now turn to evidence of strategic responses by originators to reduce entry by parallel traders.
Have originators reduced price differentials?
Since price controls restrict the ability of pharmaceutical firms to increase price, I
focus here on whether firms decrease prices in order to deter, or in response to, entry by parallel traders. To make entry by parallel traders less attractive, the originator can reduce the average price differential between a high price country and those with lower prices. Originators should be more likely to reduce prices of those versions for which parallel trade is possible, i.e., those with many matches in other countries. They may also choose to reduce price on products facing parallel imports, in order to make substitution towards parallel imports less attractive to pharmacists or patients.
Products in non-EU countries face no threat of parallel imports, and products in the EU face entry by parallel traders only if there are other EU countries with a matching version at a lower price. Similarly, a given product does not experience entry by parallel traders in all countries. To look for strategic price responses, I first estimate a regression that exploits this variation across countries and over time for each drug version, i.e. This regression relies on variation in the threat of entry or actual entry over time within each country-drug version pair to identify strategic responses. There is a serious endogeneity problem with both regressions: the number of source markets, or my measure of the threat of entry, is also under the control of the originator. Future work will address this issue by estimating the choice of launch markets and the pricing decision simultaneously. Table 6 contains the results of the price response regressions, which are estimated using data from EU countries only (as only these observations would have any variation in actual or potential entry by parallel traders). The parameter estimate from the specification that relies on both cross-sectional and time variation (Column 1) indicates that products with parallel trade are priced higher than the average of identical versions in other countries without parallel trade. Threat of entry does not appear to constrain prices, either; the coefficient on the threat of entry variable is positive and significant. These estimates suggest that products with parallel trade remain relatively expensive even after parallel importing begins. The results from the specification that relies on within country-drug version variation (i.e. only variation over time) in the second column of Table 6 show a statistically significant price reduction following entry by parallel imports.
However, once again firms do not seem to respond to the threat of entry by reducing price differentials to make entry less attractive.
These parameter estimates imply that firms respond to entry by parallel imports by lowering prices about 4%, though not before parallel importing actually begins. This is in contrast to Goolsbee and Syverson (2005) , who show that airlines respond to the threat of entry by Southwest Airlines well before Southwest begins flying on a competing route. In this setting, the threat of competition from parallel imports does not appear to result in pre-emptive price cuts. Parallel trade does have an impact on price once an importer enters the market, but since only 7% of products in the EU with at least one matching product actually experience entry by parallel traders, this has had a small effect in the aggregate so far.
Have originators reduced the number of matching products in both high and low price countries?
To test whether pharmaceutical firms have adjusted their product offerings to reduce the potential for parallel trade, I examine the overlap of products between pairs of countries over time. Each country-period is an observation, with a vector of dummy variables indicating whether a product is available. I calculate the Jaccard similarity measure of any two country-period pairs, S ijt , as the number of versions available in both countries i and j in the period t divided by the number of versions available in only one of the two countries. 14 The higher this number, the more similar the product mix. I 14 I experimented with other similarity measures, such as the simple matching coefficient and the Bray and Curtis coefficient, and found the same results.
calculate similarity based on a product being any version of a chemical for sale in a country (drug similarity), and again defining a product as a specific version (form and strength) of a drug (version similarity). I estimate the following regression equation:
where market similarity is calculated as the correlation between a set of variables from OECD Health Data on demographics and pharmaceutical demand, and the relationship between countries i and j is defined as whether both are EU members and whether they are likely source or destination markets for parallel imports. When estimating this equation for version similarity, I include drug similarity as a control variable. Table 7 presents the results of this analysis for drug similarity, and version similarity results are in Table 8 .
The parameter estimates in Table 7 show that a pair of any two EU countries has more similar drugs than a pair of non-EU countries or an EU/non-EU pair, though the interaction between the time trend and the dummy for a pair of EU countries indicates the similarity of EU markets has increased less than the similarity of other markets over time.
This may be somewhat surprising, since changes to the approval process in the EU should have reduced the cost of gaining regulatory approval in multiple EU countries.
However, it is consistent with and Kyle (2005) , who show that pharmaceutical firms are avoiding or delaying launch in EU countries with price controls, which are likely to be source countries for parallel trade. Pairs that include a source country and a destination country, like Denmark-Greece, are roughly as close in the availability of drugs as a random pair of other countries, despite both being in the "common market." For the subset of US-launched drugs, pairs of source countries appear more similar. However, this reflects a common lack of US-launched drugs rather than common availability, and this result is not robust to the method of calculating similarity (results of alternative similarity measures are available on request).
Pairs of EU countries have more overlap of versions as well, and the version mixes are becoming more similar over time across EU countries, based on the results in Table 8 . However, the difference in similarity is mostly driven by pairs of "destination" countries (such as UK-Germany or UK-Finland). Pairs that include a source country and a destination country, like Denmark-Greece, are less similar than a random pair of other countries, despite both being in the "common market." This finding holds for a variety of similarity measures (not included). Interestingly, the interaction of drug similarity and the time trend is negative. This suggests that even as they launch drugs in more countries, firms have increased differentiation of versions available across countries.
Overall, these results are consistent with an adjustment of product offerings to reduce the potential for parallel trade. Similarity of both drugs and versions of drugs is lower between pairs of source countries and destination countries than between other pairs of EU countries. In addition, similarity is greatest between pairs of destination countries, while pairs of source countries have less overlap of versions than any other EU pairing. This may indicate a strategy of producing versions for sale in all high price (destination) markets, and at the same time producing different versions in each of the likely low price (source) markets to limit both the number of arbitrage opportunities and the availability of supply sources.
As a second test for how product offerings change in response to parallel imports, I look for evidence of product line "culling," or selective exit of drug versions. That is, are firms more likely to discontinue versions of a drug that are threatened by parallel imports or that may serve as a source of parallel imports into a higher price market? I estimate a logit for exit, 
where ϕ is a country-drug version fixed effect and κ is a time period fixed effect. This specification relies on changes in import or export threat within a drug version-country, while the first relies on variation in import or export threat within a drug version across countries.
Results from regressions of exit are contained in Table 9 . First, I estimate a logit for exit on the entire sample using a dummy variable for whether a country is an EU member, and therapeutic class and period fixed effects. Products in EU countries are more likely to be discontinued than in the average of the other 15 countries for which I have data. Within the EU, products that are likely to face competition from parallel imports (versions in relatively high price countries) or that are likely to be the source of parallel exports (versions in relatively low price countries) have a higher probability of being discontinued. Within a drug version-country observation, the change in the probability of exit associated with a change in the threat of import or export cannot be estimated with any statistical precision. (For now, I have results only for a linear probability model due to difficulties in obtaining convergence with a logit.)
These results provide limited evidence of product line "culling" in response to parallel trade. The EU overall has a higher rate of exit of versions than other countries, and across EU countries, versions of products that are likely to be targets or sources of parallel imports are more likely to be discontinued.
Have originators taken steps to increase transportation costs?
I examine the overlap of brand names between pairs of countries over time to test whether firms use different brand names in across countries. Such differences require parallel traders to repackage products for import, and so increase their transportation costs. The approach taken is analogous to that of version overlap. Each country-period is an observation, with a vector of dummy variables indicating whether a given brand name is used in the country. I calculate the Jaccard similarity measure of any two country-period pairs, S ijt , as the number of brand names available in both countries i and j in the period t divided by the number of brand names available in only one of the two countries. I estimate the following regression equation:
Results are presented in Table 10 . Interestingly, pairs of EU countries have lower similarity than pairs of other countries. As expected, source-destination pairs have even lower overlap of brand names. Over time, the overlap between source and destination pairs is increasing, but at a slower rate than the similarity between pairs of destination countries is increasing. While version similarity was greatest between destination countries and lowest between pairs of source countries, the opposite is true in the case of brand name similarity. This pattern is still consistent with increasing the cost of repackaging for parallel importers, however. The lack of similarity between source and destination markets means that parallel importers must relabel many of the products they ship to destination markets. In addition, while there may be substantial overlap in the versions of drugs available in destination countries, a parallel importer would be required to repackage a product for sale in each of them if they have different brand names. Thus, this use of brand names denies parallel importers significant economies of scale.
VI. Discussion and Conclusion
Policymakers in the EU actively support the development of parallel trade as an important step towards a common market in pharmaceuticals. Some governments also hoped and expected that competition from parallel imports would lower drug costs in countries with relatively high prices. The European Court of Justice has, in a series of decisions, generally sided against originators in lawsuits related to parallel trade. Despite all this, parallel trade has yet to reduce price dispersion across EU member states very significantly.
In part, parallel trade may be limited as a result of policies set by national governments. Regulations on the profits of pharmacists inhibit incentives for pharmacists to seek low-priced drugs, so that many see little financial reason to stock parallel imports in lieu of original products. Patients and doctors in most countries are also rather insensitive to price, and probably see no benefit to using parallel imported versions of products. And although much has been done to facilitate parallel trade, parallel importers still face many regulations on their activities and substantial documentation requirements due to concerns about drug safety.
However, non-price responses by pharmaceutical firms may also be playing a role.
Firms do cut prices in response to actual entry, but this affects a small number of products. In addition to rationing supply -a strategy that has faced a number of legal challenges -firms appear to adjust their product offerings in each country to minimize the potential for parallel trade. "Versioning" and "culling" limit the number of arbitrage opportunities. Such a strategy is, of course, costly to the firm: it means additional regulatory fees and higher production costs. An important question is whether these costs add any consumer benefit. This paper illustrates one way firms adapt to changes in intellectual property and trade law. While the pharmaceutical industry differs from most others in the extent to which it is regulated, non-price responses are important for other IP-intensive sectors as well, including consumer electronics and software. Non-price responses such as these have received little attention in the debate over the welfare effects of parallel trade.
Firms should have higher profits than under perfect arbitrage, which may offset the negative effects of parallel trade on long-run incentives to invest in research. However, these strategies also offset the expected consumer gains from parallel trade.
Understanding their impact may be important in evaluating whether to legalize parallel trade in other countries, and how to adjust other policies or regulations to achieve penetration of parallel imports if that is the goal. Period, product* country * = significant at the 5% level, ** = significant at the 1% level. 
